Abstract
Introduction
Client's program tries to communicate with the server's program over insecure networks like Internet [1] . In the process, the identity and a secret password of a client are used for mutual authentication and access control. However, password can be compromised during transmission, if an efficient protocol is not followed. Also certain systems in a network needs to change the client's password periodically for the protection of the system resources from adversary, and until a secured password change protocol that allows the client to change the password safely, the systems are not well protected. Since Lamport in 1987 first proposed a remote password authentication protocol for the insecure communication, many researchers have proposed theirprotocols to address password authentication problems [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] .
After the authentication, two communicating parties usually need to establish session keys to protect the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of transmitted data over insecure channel. Key agreement protocol is used for the protection and Diffie and Hellman proposed the first key agreement protocol [9] , which does not use identity authentication mechanism and suffers from the man in the middle attack. Therefore, authentication and key agreement are combined to yield the concept of authenticated key agreement (AKA). AKA has great interest in network security field and many AKA protocols have been proposed [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . AKA protocols can be divided into two categories, two-party AKA (2PAKA) protocols and three-party AKA (3PAKA) protocols, depending on whether an online trusted server is required or not. 2PAKA first submits his/her identity information and his/her password to serverS for the registration. If S accepts this request, S will perform the following steps:
Step 1 :Computes = 0 ( , ), = 1 ( , ) , ′ = 2 ( , ) , = ⊕ , ′ = ⊕ ′ andℎ = 3 ( , ′ ).
Step 2 :Destroys , ′ , and , and then stores A, , ′ and ℎ to the memory of [19] . Note that hash functions 0 and 3 do not need to be modeled as random oracles, because they are only used to protect the shared keys in the smart card and do not be used during each run of the protocol.
A's smart card. After this, the smart card is protected with the password and user A can freely choose and change the password.
Login Phase
After inserting their smart card into their card reader, A and B must input their passwords to their smart cards to use them. Their smart cards perform the following verification process,
respectively.
A 
Password Updating Phase
Suppose A wants to change his/her password to a new password * , he/she will perform the following steps:
Step ( , ′ , ℎ ) After login success:
Smart card:
( , ′ , ℎ ) After login success: 
Key Agreement Phase
Suppose A and B wish to agree on a shared session key. The process of the key agreement is shown in Figure 1 . There are three rounds and four messages during each run of the protocol. The details are as follows: 
Security Analysis on Yang et al.'s 3PAKA Protocol
This section provides security analyses and privacy issue analysis on Yang, et al., 3PAKA protocol. The protocol is weak against offline password guessing attack with lost smartcard and does not provide authentication in the password updating phase. Furthermore, it is possible to be tracked by attacker because the protocol does not provide user anonymity.
Password Guessing Attack
One of the most important security requirements for password-based authentication protocols is to resist against password guessing attack. In Yang, et al., protocol, a user is allowed to choose his/her own password during the registration and the password change phases. The user usually tends to select passwords with easy-to-remember, which has low entropy. Hence, these passwords are potentially vulnerable to password guessing attack. Yang, et al., argued that their 3PAKA protocol is strong against password guessing attack. However, we will show that Yang, et al., 3PAKA protocol is weak against password guessing attack with the assumption that an attacker could get a legal user's smartcard and read the memory on it as the same assumptions in the other papers [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] .
For the off-line password guessing attack, attacker with legal user A's information {A, , ′ , ℎ } on the smartcard can compute ′ by guessing a password candidate ′ , from , ′ from ′ and 3 ( , ′ ),and compares it with ℎ by following the detailed steps
Step 1 : An attacker steals a legal user A's smartcard and gets the user's information {A, , ′ , ℎ } on it.
Step 2 : The attacker chooses a password candidate ′ from the dictionary and computes Otherwise, the attacker finishes the guessing. After the password guessing attack, the attacker could disguise as legal user Ato the server successfully. Thereby, Yang, et al., 3PAKA protocol is definitely weak against password guessing attack.
Lack of Authentication for Password Updating
Authentication is accepting proof of identity given by a credible person who has evidence on the said identity, or on the originator and the object under assessment as the originator's artifact respectively [20] . Thereby, any services should check authenticity of user before the system provides them. However, the password updating phase in Yang, et al., 3PAKAprotocol does not perform authentication before the smartcard changes user's password. Any user with the smartcard could perform the phase and thereby it influence to the denial of service to the registered user due to the lack of authentication in the password updating phase.
3.3Lack of Privacy Preserving
Privacy, especially focused on the anonymity for the secrecy of the identities of communicating parties, is becoming a major concern in many multiuser network environments. For example, anonymity is one of the crucial focuses for ubiquitous computing and requires that the identity of any user should be protected from the outsiders. Many AKA protocols have been proposed, which implement different aspects of anonymity [13, [21] [22] .
As for Yang, et al., 3PAKA protocol, the user's identities A and B areexposed in the authentication messages as {A, ,
ℎ ′ }} at rounds 1 to 3, respectively. Anybody could easily trace the message and get some important information by tracking the identities of each message, which knows who send the message and how many times does the user send to when and whom. Comparatively, a more ideal anonymity property for the AKA protocol is un-traceability, which meansthat the adversary can know neither who the sender is norwhether two conversations originate from the same user. The server needs not to maintain a security-sensitive verification table The password is memorable and can be chosen freely by the user The password cannot be derived by the privileged administrator of the server The security of the protocol is not based on the tamper resistance assumption of the smart card The protocol can resist various kinds of sophisticated attacks, such as offline password guessing attack, replay attack, parallel session attack, denial of service attack, stolen verifier attack and user/server impersonation attack The password cannot be broken by guessing attack even if the smart card is lost/stolen and compromised The client and the server can establish a common session key during the authentication process The protocol is not prone to the problems of clock synchronization and time delay The user can change the password locally without any interaction with the authentication server The protocol can achieve mutual authentication The protocol preserves privacy by providing user anonymity and un-traceability The protocol provides the property of forward secrecy
P_3PAKA Protocol
This section proposes anew privacy preserving 3PAKA (P_3PAKA) protocol using smart cards to solve the security problems in Yang et al.'s protocol after summarizes the required design criteria for P_3PAKA protocol. P_3PAKAprotocol adopts dynamic identifier depending on each session's nonce to provide user anonymity and un-traceability. P_3PAKA protocol is composed of 4 phases, registration, login, key agreement, and password updating.
Required Security Criteria
This sub-section summarizes12 required criteria for smart card based 3PAKA protocol in terms of security and efficiency as shown in Table 2 , which is the design goal of the proposed protocol.
Registration Phase
Let s and = denote the server S's private key and its corresponding public key, where s is kept secret by S and is stored inside each user's smart card. Here, we take user A's registration as an example. First of all,A submits his/heridentifier A and hashed password = 0 ( , )to S, where and dare the password of A and random number, respectively. If S accepts this request, it will perform the following steps
Step 1 : Computes = 0 ( , ), = 1 ( , ), = ⊕ , and ℎ = 3 ( , ).
Step 2 : Stores ,ℎ and to the memory of A's smart card.
After this, A should store d on his/her smart card. Note that the smart card is protected with user's identifier A and password .
Login Phase
International Journal of Security and Its Applications Vol. 8, No.4 (2014) After inserting their smart card into their card reader, A and B must input theiridentifier and password to their smart cards to use them. Then their smart cards perform the following verification process, respectively.
Step 1 :A's smart card computes = 0 ( , ), = 0 ( , ), = ⊕ and ℎ ′ = 3 ( , ). If ℎ ′ ≠ ℎ , it aborts the execution and destroys .
Step 1 :B's smart card computes = 0 ( , ), = 0 ( , ), = ⊕ and ℎ ′ = 3 ( , ). If ℎ ′ ≠ ℎ ,it aborts the execution and destroys .
Password Updating Phase
Whenever user wants to change his/her password, he/she could perform this phase without helping of S. Smart card performs the password change only if the user authentication is successful as the same as in the first step on the login phase. The steps for the password updating is as follows
Step 
Key Agreement Phase
Suppose A and B wish to agree on a shared session key sk AB . The process of the key agreement is shown in Figure 2 . There are three rounds and four messages during each run of P_3PAKAprotocol. The details are as follows ( , ℎ , ) After login success:
( , ℎ , ) After login success: 
Security and Performance Analyses
This section provides the security analysis and the performance analysis of P_3PAKA protocol by comparing it with the related protocols in [14] [15] and [17] [18] . The performance analysis isfocused on the computational and communicational overhead.
Security Analysis
This sub-section provides the security analysis of P_3PAKA protocol focused on password guessing attack, replay attack, parallel session attack, password disclosure to server, stolen verifier attack, server impersonation attack and user impersonation attack, and the aspects that P_3PAKA provides privacy and forward secrecy. Table 3 shows the security comparison based on the criteria in the sub-section 4.1 among the related protocols in [14] [15] and [17] [18] . The reason why the protocols in [14] [15] and [17] [18] are selected to compare with is that these protocols have similar aspects with ours.
Password Guessing Attack:
We could have the same assumption from the sub-Section 3.1 that an attacker could get a legal user's smart card and read the memory on it. Then only information the attacker could get are { ,ℎ ,
, d} from the memory of the smart card. Additionally, the attacker could have intercepted messages of { , , ℎ },{ , , ℎ , , , ℎ }, { , , ′ , ℎ ′ }, and { , , ′ , ℎ ′ }from the previous sessions. Even if the attacker could get the information, it is not possible to derive the password or the identifier A from them due to the onewayness of the hash function. There is only related to the password that the attacker has. To find the correct password , the attacker needs to know to derive from and A from . However, there is no way that the attacker knows these two values at the same time. In the other aspect, the attacker could have the identifier related value . However, the attacker could not get any valuable identifier information from = ⊕ ℎ( , ) due to the one-wayness of the hash function and the discrete logarithm problem. Thereby, it is impossible to perform password guessing attack against P_3PAKA protocol. : P_3PAKA protocol is secure against  replay  attack  because  the  login  and  key  agreement  messages  { , , ℎ },{ , , ℎ , , , ℎ }, { , , ′ , ℎ ′ }, and { , , ′ , ℎ ′ } are secured by using session dependent fresh random numbersa, b and t. On the other hand, P_3PAKA protocol could resist against parallel session attackthat an adversary pretend as legitimate user A or B by resending a previously intercepted authentication message. The server could check the freshness of session dependent random number related value or in the authentication message. Furthermore, the attacker cannot compute session key related information due to the lack of knowledge related with a orb. Thereby, P_3PAKA protocol is secure against replay attack and parallel session attack. Thereby, P-3PAKA protocol is secure against password disclosure to server and stolen verifier attack.
Replay Attack and Parallel Session Attack

Server ImpersonationAttack:
For this attack, although an attacker can access the transmitted messages, the attacker cannot compute the correct ′ = ( ) and ′ = ( ) from them because the attacker does not know the server's secret key s.In the case that and the computation overhead by comparing with the related protocols in [14] [15] and [17] [18] . Since the login phase and key agreement phase are executed more frequently than the other two phases, only the computation cost and communication overhead during them are taken into consideration.
P_3PAKA protocol only needs three rounds of message communication while the protocols in [14] [15] need five rounds of messages. This means that P_3PAKA protocol can enable shorter communication latency and more rapid response than the protocols in [14] [15] . Protocols in [17] [18] require the same communication overhead but they have lack of securities as shown in Table 3 .
For the computation overhead, we do not take XOR operation into account because the time complexity of ⊕ is negligible as compared to the other three operations. Typically, time complexity associated with these operations can be roughly expressed as time for modular exponentiation > time for encryption > time for hash. P_3PAKA protocol has a bit more computational overhead compared to the protocols in [14, 15, 17] but similar with the protocol in [18] as shown in Table 4 . The overhead is for the costs from the additional required properties in the criteria at the sub-section 4.1.
Table 4. Performance Comparison between Related Protocols
Protocol Property Protocol in [14] Protocol in [15] Protocol in [17] Protocol in [18] P_3PAKA Communication overhead Number of rounds 
Conclusion
Because AKA protocols have great practical usages in many network environments, especially in financial secure applications, they have been widely deployed. This paper has reviewed Yang, et al., provably secure 3PAKA protocol using smart cards and shown that the protocol is weak against offline password guessing attack with lost smartcard and does not provide authentication in the password updating phase. Furthermore, it is possible to be tracked by attacker because Yang, et al., 3PAKA protocol does not provide user anonymity. In order to solve the weaknesses in Yang, et al., 3PAKA protocol, this paper proposed a privacy preserving 3PAKA (P_3PAKA) protocol using smart cards. P_3PAKAprotocol provides user anonymity and un-traceability by using dynamic identifier depending on each session's nonce.As shown in the analyses, P_3PAKA protocol is more secure while maintaining efficiency than the other previous protocols.
